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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRIGHAM B. HARVEY and RUTH 
M. HARVEY, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
-vs.-
HAIGHTS BENCH IRRIGATION 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 8631 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
STATEMENT 
Appellant in its Reply Brief questions two factual 
statements made by respondents in their brief and an-
swers respondents' cross-appeal. 
FACTUAL STATEMENT 
On Page 5 of respondents' brief the following state-
ment is made: "* * * and left him no crossing across the 
c.anal." This fact was due entirely to Mr. Harvey's own 
action. Appellant offered, during the construction of the 
concrete ditch and immediately after it was finished., 
to construct a bridge across the ditch and asked Mr. 
Harvey where he wanted it constructed. Mr. Harvey said 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
he did not know (R. 173-179). On Page 7 of respondents' 
brief it is stated: "It never used any part of the e.ast 
bank." The evidence clearly shows that the east bank was 
used to a certain extent (R. 165). 
CROSS-APPEAL 
The question the court must determine in this case 
1.s whether the admitted fact that appellant intends to 
place water from new sources in the ditch, and to place 
it in the ditch 'vhen it normally would have been dry, 
supports the contention that this is such an increase of 
the burden on the servient estate that they are justified 
in asking damages therefor or requiring condemnation 
proceedings, or whether such facts support the conten-
tion of appellant that it is merely using .an existing 
easement and obtaining all of the benefits possible from 
said easement. The latter is not considered as increasing 
the burden to such an extent that either damages may 
be aw.arded therefor or condemnation proceedings re-
quired. 
Respondents in their brief n1ake the following state-
ment: 
"If I had a water right for one cubic foot 
of water and would burden your land by taking 
one foot across it, there just isn't any authority 
under which I can enlarge it to t\YO feet or ten 
feet." 
By this staten1ent \Ve take it that respondents do not 
me.an that the ditch over \vhich the one cubic foot of 
water \Vould be carried \vould haYe to be enlarged in 
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3 
order to carry additional water, but merely that the 
easement would not permit them to carry water through 
the existing ditch from which they have in the past been 
bringing one cubic foot of water. In other words, they 
could not increase the flow or use their easement for 
a longer period of time in order to carry the additional 
wate-r even though it might he safely conveyed through 
the same ditch without damage to the servient estate by 
overflowing etc. 
If respondents' contention were true, it would mean 
that if a married couple without children had an easement 
for a right of way, either as a foot p;ath or automobile 
travel, that in the future when their family increased 
the additional members of the family could not use 
the easement. This is not a correct statement of the 
law as will appear from the Oregon c.ase hereinafter 
cited which discusses several of such type of cases. It 
is our contention that the cases cited by respondents 
do not support and in fact, do not apply to the question 
involved on the cross-appeal. 
The cases cited by respondents are analyzed as fol-
lows: 
The c.ase of Nash vs. Clark, 27 Utah 158, 75 P. 371 
involved the question of condemning a right of way in 
a ditch owned by the defendants and to enlarge the 
ditch in order to carry the water appropriated to plain-
tiff's use. Plaintiff was successful in his condemnation 
proceedings. 
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In the case of Smith vs. Rock Creek Water Corpora-
tion, ( C.alif.) 208 P. 2d 705, there was no question of 
taking additional water by plaintiffs in an existing ease-
ment of their own. The defendants cut down shade trees, 
destroyed bridge.s, left debris upon the land of plaintiff, 
even close to his dwelling, and constructed sluiceways 
across an open ditch. The court held that the defendant 
was liable for damages, and in that connection said: 
"The secondary easement is no more than 
the right to make rep.airs and to do such things 
as are necessary to the exercise of the right and 
to do them only when necessary and in such 
r.easonable manner as not to increase the burden 
needlessly on the servient estate or to enlarge 
it by alteration in the mode of operation." 
In the present case there is no evidence to show 
that the work appellant did. in improving the ditch was 
not necessary and was not done in a reasonable manner, 
with the exception of leaving some of the debris on 
respondents' land, which .appellant concedes should have 
been removed and which point should have no effect 
upon the question involved in the cross-appeal. 
The ca.se of Nielsen vs. Sandb,erg., 105 Utah 93, 
141 P. 2d 696, is a case involving the right to change the 
use of an easement by changing the use to '"'hich the 
water was to be put. Originally it 'Yas for power pur-
poses. Afterwards an attempt 'vas n1ade to use it for 
swimming pool purposes and to in1pose upon the servient 
estate the duty of not conta1ninating the 'vater by per-
mitting turkeys to feed and run upon his o'vn land. 
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The case of Stephens Ranch vs. Union Pacific Rail-
road Co., 48 lTtah 528, 161 P. 459, is a case involving 
the question of p·ermitting the Railroad to enlarge certain 
dams and thereby causing much larger quantities of 
flood water to be c.a.st upon plaintiff's land. The court 
held that they may have had an easement for casting 
upon plaintiff's land a certain amount of flood waters, 
but they did not have the right to enlarge their dams 
and thereby increase the flood waters causing plaintiff 
damage. 
Robin vs. Roberts, 80 Utah 409, 15 P. 2d 340. This 
case held that where they had an easement for flooding 
an .area of plaintiff's land defendant could construct 
a larger dam on his own property, providing he did not 
flood plaintiff's land to any greater extent than his 
easement allowed. Again, the principle involved was 
entirely different than in the p·resent case. 
The following cases set forth the true .and correct 
rule governing easements. 
Bernards et ux vs. Link et al (Ore.) 248 P. 2d 341. 
In this case there was an easement granted for building 
a logging railroad which was used for such purpose 
for several years. Later the comp.any became insolvent 
and the easement right was sold to plaintiff who owned 
large tracts of timber land surrounding the easement. 
The railroad was removed and a logging ro.ad con-
structed. The court made the follo,ving com1nents: 
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"From the earliest of times the courts, in 
their conS'truction of instruments which granted 
easements, have sought to discern and give effect 
in a practical manner to the purposes of the grant, 
with the result th.at the grantee in his enjoyment 
of the easement has never been restricted to the 
exact conditions which existed when the grant was 
made. The leading authority is Luttrel's Case, 
4 Rep. 86, which was decided in 1601. * * *." 
"Although the owner of a right of way over 
land of another is limited in his use of the right 
to the terms of the grant, yet it is settled that 
the gr.antee may avail himself of modern im-
provements which will enable him to enjoy more 
fully the rights which were granted. In other 
"\vords, in determining the meaning of the grant, 
it will be inferred, in the absence of expTess lan-
guage to the contrary, that the grantee is not 
restricted to the methods of use \vhich \vere cur-
rent at the time of the grant. vVe shall now take 
notice of a few of the decisions upon this phase 
of the controversy." 
A Virginia Court in the case of T""irginia Hot Springs 
vs. Lowman (Va.) 101 S.E. 326, held in a case involsing 
a turnpike road .as follo,vs: 
"But if the new use is in all respects of the 
same nature and character as the old, and the 
difference is in degree only, and no additional 
burden is put upon the servient estate, then the 
new use is within the pTescriptive use. Bald,vin 
vs. Boston & ~{. R. Co. 181 ~lass. 166, 63 N.E. 
428." 
Henkle et al 'CS. Golden-son et al (~Iich.) 2-±S N.\v·. 
574. 
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In this case the defendants' predecessors in interest 
owned a large tract of land and had an easement over 
a private ro.ad. Part of this tract of land vvas then sold 
to five individuals, defendants in the case, together 
with the easement. The plaintiffs claimed that by cutting 
up the lot into smaller parcels it would cast an additional 
burden upon the private ro.ad not contemplated by the 
original grantor thereof, and that consequently the five 
defendants, who acquired title to the northerly half of 
the lot, acquired from the grantor no right to use said 
private road. The question was: Is this an unlawful 
.additional burden imposed on the land of the servient 
estate? The Court held: 
"The application of the rule against unreas-
onable and unlawful increase of burden upon the 
servient estate is largely a question of fact. 9 
R. C. L. 790. Harvey vs. c·rane, 85 Mich. 316, 
48 N.W. 582, 12 L.R.A. 601. Gener.ally, a mere 
increase in the number of persons using an un-
limited right of way to which the land is subject 
is not an unlawful additional burden. 9 R.C.L. 791. 
Note 95 Am. St. Rep. 326. But it is recognized 
that in some cases the increase may be such in 
fact as to amount to an unre:asonable burden. 
The trial court here held that the grant to five 
persons in fee did not in fact create an unlawful 
additional burden. In this he is clearly right. 
The case of Bang vs. Forman, 244 Mich. 571, 222 
N.W. 96, is not authority for the extreme position 
of plaintiffs. In that case, in addition to ease-
ment, there was also a building restriction. No 
other matter demands discussion." 
See also: 
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Unverz1agt vs. Miller1 (Mich.) 10 N.W. 2d 849. 
From the above authorities it is apparent that 
merely bringing water from a source different than 
Farmington Canyon and having the water conveyed over 
the easement for two or three months longer period of 
time would not unreasonably or unnecessarily increase 
th-e burden on the servient estate so as to give rise to 
damages or force condemnation. In fact, to so hold or 
to modify or change the decision of the Moyle case "\vould 
prevent the taking of a forward or progressive step, 
so recognized by the general public, when not in itself 
injurious or destructive. 
The case of Anderson vs. Knoxville Power & Light 
Co. 16 Tenn. App. 259, 64 S.W. 2d 204, holds: 
"'Ap,pellants compl~aint of the added noise, 
vibration, and pedestrian and automobile travel 
as an additional burden which the defendants 
as original owners never agreed to permit and 
should not now, as abutting owners, he compelled 
to endure when such was not conte1nplated vvhen 
the deeds were executed. Eliminating the matter 
of additional travel, for which neither part~~ is 
wholly responsible, the additional nois-e and vibra-
tion found by the court is not such an elen1ent as 
should wholly hinder and prevent the taking of 
a forward or progressive step, so recognized by 
the general public, when not in itself injurious 
or destructive.' " 
In fact, to require the o":"ner of an ease1nent to con-
demn for further rights every tin1e there is a deYelop-
ment of a new source of "\Vater or an increase in the 
flow which could be transn1itted through the existing 
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easement without material damage to the servient estate 
would unduly burden everyone interested in irrigation 
and work a great detriment to the advancement of irri-
gation. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that respondents' cross-
appeal should be denied and that appellant should be 
gr.anted the relief asked for in its original brief. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GUSTIN, RICHARDS & 
MATTSSON 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Appellant. 
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